Kemeny proposed a voting scheme which is distinguished by the fact that it is the unique voting scheme that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick showed that determining the winner in Kemeny's system is NP-hard. We provide a stronger lower bound and an upper bound matching the lower bound, namely, we show that determining the winner in Kemeny's system is complete for P NP , the class of sets solvable via parallel access to NP.
Introduction
We investigate the complexity of determining the winner of Kemeny's voting scheme. Kemeny's voting system is distinguished by the fact that it is the unique voting system which is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet. With voting scheme here is meant a rule for choosing winning candidates (or alternatives) based on the voter preference rankings.
For the case of more than two candidates, it is not trivial to say what the right way of evaluating the rankings of the voters is. As an example of the difficulties occurring, see the prominent Condorcet Paradox [3] dating back to 1785: assume there are 3n voters with the preference rankings a > b > c, b > c > a, and c > a > b, each given by exactly n voters. If we evaluate the rankings by majority rule, then we get a cyclic aggregate preference ranking: a defeats b, b defeats c, and c defeats a.
Social choice theorists have investigated various different voting schemes, each having its specific advantages and disadvantages. There are a number of "reasonable" properties that one would like a voting system to satisfy, including nondictatorship, monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the Pareto principle. Arrow's famous Impossibility Theorem [1] states that there is no voting scheme enjoying all the just mentioned properties.
The investigation of computational complexity issues involved in voting schemes is a relatively young field. Automated group decision making is becoming an important issue, which calls for an investigation of voting rules from a computational complexity point of view. Bartholdi et al. [2] studied a voting system suggested by Dodgson (who is better known by his pen name, Lewis Carroll) in 1876. In that paper, it was shown that it is NP-hard to determine whether a given candidate has won a given election in Lewis Carroll's voting scheme. Hemaspaandra et al. [6] improved that result by raising the lower bound to P NP . They also proved a matching upper bound, thus obtaining P NP -completeness for Dodgson's voting scheme.
Bartholdi et al. [2] also investigated Kemeny's voting scheme. Kemeny's voting scheme, which will be described in Section 2, was introduced by Kemeny [9] and specified by Levenglick [11] . Young and Levenglick [18] showed that Kemeny's voting scheme is the unique voting scheme that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet. Bartholdi et al. showed that determining the winner in Kemeny's voting scheme is NP-hard. The exact complexity of Kemeny's voting scheme however remained an open problem. We show that the winner problem for Kemeny's voting scheme is P NPcomplete.
Another voting system whose computational complexity has recently been investigated is Young's voting scheme [14] . Young's voting scheme also turned out to be P NP -complete. This raises the question of what is special about P NP that all these voting schemes are complete for this class. The above-mentioned voting schemes have in common that they assign a hard-to-compute score to each candidate, and the candidates with lowest (or highest in case of Young's voting system) score are the winners. The value of the score is in all three cases polynomially bounded in the size of the input. That easily yields P NP as an upper bound. It is known that "comparison versions" of NP-hard optimization problems often are complete for P NP (for instance, the problem of comparing the maximum vertex cover sizes of two given graphs). That gives some hint that these voting schemes might be P NP -complete. However, the actual proofs of the P NP lower bounds are complicated and are substantially different in each case. In particular, these problems do not easily reduce to each other. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define Kemeny's voting scheme and the decision problems that we study. In Section 3, we give some background on the class P NP and outline the proof of the main result. In Section 4, we prove our main result.
Kemeny's voting scheme
Like Dodgson's and Young's voting schemes, Kemeny's voting scheme is a preferential voting system. Each voter casts his or her vote by ranking all the candidates in order of preference. Ties are explicitly allowed. 2 For example, a voter may rank candidates a, b, c, d, and e by the preference ranking a > b = c > d > e. Candidate a is the favorite, and e is the least favorite candidate in this ranking. Candidates b and c are considered to be of equal desirability, i.e., they are tied. A preference ranking without ties is called a strict preference ranking. We identify each voter with its preference ranking, and we will view the set of voters as a multiset of preference rankings.
Kemeny defined the outcome of an election as the collection of preference rankings that are "closest" to the preference rankings of the voters. Such a preference ranking is called a Kemeny consensus. A candidate is a winner of the election if it is a preferred candidate in a Kemeny consensus.
There are different ways to define closeness. For Kemeny elections, the goal is to minimize the Kemeny score: the sum of the distances to the preference rankings of the voters.
For each pair P, Q of preference rankings we define the distance
where the sum is taken over all unordered pairs {c, d} of candidates, and Given a set of candidates C and a multiset of preference rankings V on C, we define the following three Kemeny score functions:
• For every preference ranking P on C,
• For every candidate c ∈ C, KemenyScore(C, V , c) = min{KemenyScore(C, V , P ) | P is a preference ranking on C, and c is a preferred candidate in P}.
• KemenyScore(C, V ) = min{KemenyScore(C, P , V ) | P is a preference ranking on C }.
We define the following decision problems related to Kemeny elections: 
Decision problem: Kemeny Winner
Instance: A set of candidates C; a multiset V of preference rankings on C; a candidate c ∈ C. Question: Is there some Kemeny consensus P in which no candidate is strictly preferred to c? Equivalently, is
Decision problem: Kemeny Ranking Instance: A set of candidates C; a multiset V of preference rankings on C; two distinguished candidates c, d
As is usual, we represent the multisets of preference rankings by lists of preference rankings. Multiplicities of the same preference ranking are given by repetition (i.e, not by a number in binary). This representation corresponds to elections in which traditional paper ballots are used. In such elections, the input size is naturally given by the number of candidates multiplied by the number of voters. 3 Bartholdi et al. [2] showed that Kemeny Score is NP-complete and that Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are NP-hard. We now state the main result of this paper. 
Parallel access to NP
P NP is the class of sets solvable by some P oracle machine that, instead of asking its oracle queries sequentially, accesses its NP oracle in parallel. This type of access is also known as truth-table access, which was introduced by Ladner et al. [10] , and the class is also written as P NP tt . Clearly, NP ∪ coNP ⊆ P NP ⊆ P NP , and all these inclusions are believed to be strict. P NP is an extremely robust class, that has many different characterizations. For example, Hemaspaandra [7] proved that P NP is equal to the class P NP [log] (the class of languages that can be solved via O(log n) queries to an NP oracle), which was introduced by Papadimitriou and Zachos [13] . Wagner [17] introduced the name p 2 for P NP [log] and proved that
Wagner provided a useful tool to prove P NP -hardness and applied it to prove dozens of problems complete for P NP [16] , though none of these problems were particularly natural. Hemaspaandra et al. used Wagner's tool to prove P NPcompleteness for Lewis Caroll's voting scheme [6] . Very recently [14] stated P NP -completeness for Young's voting scheme. There also exist natural P NP -complete problems in artificial intelligence and modal logic (see [4] ).
In [2] , NP-hardness for Kemeny Score is proved by a reduction from the NP-complete digraph problem Feedback Arc Set. Our approach to prove P NP -hardness for Kemeny Winner is the following. Define a P NP -complete version Feedback Arc Set Member of Feedback Arc Set that is P NP -complete and adapt the reduction from Feedback Arc Set to Kemeny Score so that it becomes a reduction from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Winner and from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Ranking.
There exists a long list of NP-complete problems, but there are not that many known P NP -complete problems. In particular, no P NP -complete version of Feedback Arc Set was previously known. Fortunately, there are known P NP -complete vertex cover problems, and we are able to turn Karp's [8] reduction from Vertex Cover to Feedback Arc Set into a reduction from a P NP -complete vertex cover problem to Feedback Arc Set Member.
Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are complete for P NP
In this section, we will prove the main result of this paper, namely that Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are complete for P NP . It is easy to show that Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are in P NP . The P NP algorithms will use the set Candidate Kemeny Score as an oracle. Note that Candidate Kemeny Score is clearly in NP. Let C be a set of candidates and V a multiset of preference rankings on C. For every c ∈ C, KemenyScore(C, V , c) V · C 2 , so we can in polynomial time in parallel query all tuples C, V , c, k to Candidate Kemeny Score for all c ∈ C and all k V · C 2 . With the answers to all these queries in hand, we know KemenyScore(C,V ,c) for each candidate c∈C, since this is the smallest k such that C,V ,c,k ∈Candidate Kemeny Score. From the Kemeny scores for the candidates, it is trivial to verify that a certain candidate is a winner (has the smallest Kemeny score) or that a certain candidate ties-or-defeats another (does not have a higher Kemeny score).
It remains to show that Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are hard for P NP . The hardness proof consists of two parts. In Section 4.1 we give a reduction from the problem Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Ranking and Kemeny Winner. The P NP -hardness of Feedback Arc Set Member is shown in Section 4.2. In [2] , NP-hardness for Kemeny Score is proved by a reduction from the NP-complete digraph problem Feedback Arc Set, which will be defined below. Our approach to prove P NP -hardness for Kemeny Winner is the following. Define a version Feedback Arc Set Member of Feedback Arc Set that is P NP -complete and adapt the reduction from Feedback Arc Set to Kemeny Score so that it becomes a reduction from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Winner. We will then use this reduction to obtain a reduction from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Ranking.
Feedback Arc Set Member
We will start by defining Feedback Arc Set and Feedback Arc Set Member. Proof. We will modify the reduction from Feedback Arc Set to Kemeny Score from [2] to construct a reduction f from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Winner. In our reduction, the vertices of the graph will correspond to the candidates in the election. Suppose that we are given G,ĉ , where G = C, A is an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph, andĉ ∈ C.
Due to a note by McGarvey [12] , we can interpret G as an election. We can in polynomial time compute an election 
( G,ĉ ) = g(G),ĉ = C, V ,ĉ . We have to show that G,ĉ ∈ Feedback Arc Set Member if and only if C, V ,ĉ ∈ Kemeny Winner.
Lemma 3 in [2] can easily be strengthened such that the particular Kemeny winner is preserved. We get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 (Bartholdi et al. [2]). Given a set of candidates C and a multiset V of strict preference rankings on C. If c ∈ C is a Kemeny winner, then there exists a strict Kemeny consensus 4 such that c is the preferred candidate in the consensus.
Our election C, V consists only of strict preference rankings. That justifies the definition of the following score function.
• StrictKemenyScore(C, V , c) = min{KemenyScore(C, V , P ) | P is a strict preference ranking on C, and c is the preferred candidate in P }. Lemma 4.3 implies that the winners of C, V are the candidates with smallest StrictKemenyScore, because
StrictKemenyScore(C, V , c) = KemenyScore(C, V , c) for all Kemeny winners c.
We define the following functions in analogy to KemenyScore.
• For every strict preference ranking P on C,
• For every candidate c ∈ C, Disagree(G, c) = min{Disagree(G, P ) | P is a strict preference ranking on C, and c is the preferred candidate in P }.
The following claim is implicit in [2] .
Claim 4.4. Let g(G) = C, V . Then the following hold.
(1) For each strict preference ranking P,
KemenyScore(C, V , P ) = FixedCost(G) + 4 Disagree(G, P ).
4 A strict Kemeny consensus is a Kemeny consensus that is a strict preference ranking.
(2) For any candidate c ∈ C,
StrictKemenyScore(C, V , c) = FixedCost(G) + 4 Disagree(G, c),
where FixedCost is a function that depends neither on P nor on c.
Proof. (1) According to the definitions,
Given an unordered pair {c, d}, it is easy to see that for every strict preference ranking P,
Clearly, FixedCost(G) does not depend on P.
(2) By definition,
StrictKemenyScore(C, V , c)
= min{KemenyScore(C, V , P ) | P is a strict preference ranking on C, and c is the preferred candidate in P } = min{FixedCost(G) + 4 Disagree(G, P ) | P is a strict preference ranking on C, and c is the preferred candidate in P },
due to Claim 4.4(1). By the definition of Disagree(G, c), it follows that

StrictKemenyScore(C, V , c) = FixedCost(G) + 4 Disagree(G, c).
Hence Claim 4.4 is proved.
Claim 4.5. Disagree(G, c)= min { F | F is a FAS of G containing all arcs entering c} .
Proof. To prove that the left-hand side is less than or equal to the right-hand side, suppose that F is a FAS of G that contains all arcs entering c. Let G be the digraph that is obtained from G if we throw away all arcs that belong to F. Then G does not contain cycles and G does not contain any arcs entering c. Order C, the set of vertices of G, as 5 We can use the reduction of the previous lemma to obtain a reduction from Feedback Arc Set Member to Kemeny Ranking. The main idea is to add a special candidated that is always a winner of the election. This way, c is a winner of the election if and only ifĉ 's KemenyScore is not greater thand 's KemenyScore. Proof. Suppose that x = G,ĉ , with G an irreflexive, antisymmetric digraph andĉ ∈ V (G). It is easy to see that the following hold:
(1) G has a minimum size feedback arc set that contains all vertices enteringĉ if and only if (G ∪ {d}, ∅ ) has a minimum size feedback arc set that contains all vertices enteringĉ. 6 (2) Any minimum size feedback arc set of (G∪ {d}, ∅ ) contains all arcs enteringd (since there are no arcs enteringd). 
Feedback Arc Set Member is P NP -hard
In order to conclude from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.6 that Kemeny Winner and Kemeny Ranking are P NP -hard, we still need to show that Feedback Arc Set Member is P NP -hard. Karp [8] proved that Feedback Arc Set is NP-hard by reducing Vertex Cover to it. We will follow the same approach as in Section 4.1: we will define a P NPcomplete version Vertex Cover Member of Vertex Cover, and we will reduce Vertex Cover Member to Feedback Arc Set Member. Here are the definitions: Proof. We will use Karp's reduction from Vertex Cover to Feedback Arc Set [8] . Given an (undirected) graph G, define digraph H = W, A as follows.
•
where v is a duplicate of v for each vertex v. From [8] , we know that G contains a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if H contains a feedback arc set of size at most k. Note that this implies that the minimum size of a vertex cover for G is the same as the minimum size of a feedback arc set for H.
We modify Karp's reduction to obtain a reduction from Vertex Cover Member to Feedback Arc Set Member as follows. Proof of Lemma 4.9. The proof follows from inspection of Karp's proof [8] . We include the proof for the sake of completeness. First suppose that 
But in G, this implies that {v 1 , v 2 } ∈ E, while v 1 , v 2 ∈ V . This contradicts the fact that V is a vertex cover for G. For the converse, suppose that H has a feedback arc set A of size k that contains [v →v ]. We claim that
forms a vertex cover. Note that V k and thatv ∈ V . Suppose for a contradiction that {v 1 , v 2 } ∈ E and v 1 , v 2 ∈ V . Then (by definition)
so that we have a cycle in W, A \ A , which contradicts our assumption that A is a feedback arc set.
It remains to show that Vertex Cover Member is P NP -hard. In general, there is often a "comparison version" of an NP-complete problem that is P NP -complete. Wagner [16] stated that problems like { G, H | G and H are graphs such that the sizes of G's and H's minimum vertex covers are the same} are P NP -complete. 7 A full proof of the P NPcompleteness of the closely related problem of determining whether two graphs have maximum independent sets of the same size can be found in Appendix A of [7] . Spakowski and Vogel showed that the following problem is P NP -complete as well [15] . Definition 4.10. Min Card Vertex Cover Compare = { G, H | G and H are graphs such that the size of G's minimum vertex cover is less than or equal to the size of H's minimum vertex cover}. 7 Wagner states completeness for P NP bf , a class that was later shown to be equivalent to P NP [17] .
Lemma 4.11 (Spakowski and Vogel [15] 
Proof. Let G and H be graphs such that V (H ) = V (G)
. Let v and w be two new vertices and let F = (G ∪ {v}, ∅ ) ⊕ (H ∪ {w}, ∅ ). 8 We claim that the following holds: G, H ∈ Min Card Vertex Cover Compare if and only if F has a minimum vertex cover that contains w. Our reduction will map G, H to F, w . For G a graph, let ( G) be the minimum size of a vertex cover for G. Note that V is a vertex cover of F if and only if one of the two following statements holds: (1) V contains all vertices of (G ∪ {v}, ∅ ) and V contains a vertex cover of (H ∪ {w}, ∅ ). The smallest vertex cover of this form is of size V (G) + 1 + (H ∪ {w}, ∅ ) = V (H ) + 1 + (H ). Note that w is not part of the smallest vertex cover of this type. (2) V contains all vertices of (H ∪ {w}, ∅ ) and V contains and a vertex cover of (G ∪ {v}, ∅ ). The smallest vertex cover of this form is of size V (H ) + 1 + (G ∪ {v}, ∅ ) = V (H ) + 1 + (G). Note that w is always part of a vertex cover of this type. It follows that w is an element of a minimum size vertex cover of F if and only if there is a minimum size vertex cover of type 2 described above. This is the case if and only if (G) (H ). 
